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Introduction 
Much analysis on populism is dominated by an institutionalist perspective. 
According to this perspective populist regimes, regardless of their 
ideological persuasion, are dominated by the leader to the detriment of 
popular participation and engagement. Hence it is argued that populism is in 
essence anti-democratic, that it inhibits genuine democratic participation and 
consequently the construction of solid, long-lasting democratic institutions. 
This paper seeks to question this perspective and show that the relationship 
between leader and led is much more complex than that portrayed by this 
new-institutionalist perspective and that ideology can have a determining 
impact on the organisational forms that emerge from that relationship. 
In order to do this the paper will first of all review and critique two articles 
which are emblematic of this approach, by two of the best known analysts 
of populism, Kurt Weyland and Kenneth M. Roberts. In this review we will 
identify rational choice as the principal theory which underpins this 
perspective, leading to an overemphasis on the protagonism of the leader, 
based primarily on the leader’s ‘thirst for power’, while underemphasising 
the role of popular agency and the motivational effects on both of ideology. 
While neither of these authors can be deemed a ‘strict’ rational choice 
theory, in these papers at least their analysis depends to a great degree on 
such a perspective. 
We will then go on to critique rational choice theory in detail, arguing that 
its claims to universality and its over-emphasis on individualistic ‘utility 
maximisation’ limit its explanatory power in theory on populism. Instead, in 
the following section, we offer an alternative Marxist perspective, based on 
the works on populism by Ernesto Laclau, arguing that concepts of ideology 
and class are determining factors in the formation of populist movements. 
Finally, using as examples the populist movements of President Chávez of 
Venezuela (1999-present) and President Fujimori of Peru (1990-2001) we 
seek to show that a populist movement which is articulated to socialism will 
tend towards denser organisational networks than one articulated to 
neoliberalism. Our main conclusion, therefore, is that it is ideology and not 
simply the ‘goal-seeking behaviour’ of leader, or led, which can dictate the 
shape and form of populist movements.  
 
Institutionalist perspectives in theory on Latin 
American populism 
In order to identify specific characteristics of the institutionalist perspective 
in the literature on populism, we shall now examine in a comparative 
manner an article each by two of the foremost scholars in the field. In the 
first article, by Kurt Weyland, it is claimed that populism, or as he terms it, 
neopopulism – neoliberal populism - has affinities with neoliberals which 
are primarily based on mutual advantages which maximise their goals 
(Weyland, 2003). In the second article Kenneth M. Roberts analyses the 
differing types of organisation found in populism, maintaining that these 
organisations are in essence instruments to “push through social reforms 
and to wage conflict in extra-electoral spheres of contestation” (Roberts, 
2006: 129). While both analyses we shall contend, are valuable contributions 
which enliven debate on populism, both limit their explanatory power 
because of their narrow rational choice focus and the universalist 
assumptions behind it. Firstly, let us briefly summarise both articles before 
analysing them in a comparative manner. 
 
Weyland’s and Robert’s theories on populism 
In the first article by Kurt Weyland, published in 2003, he argues three main 
interrelated points. Firstly, populism should only be viewed politically and 
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that this perspective flows from the supposition that populist leaders are 
solely pragmatic actors whose actions are based on their own ‘thirst for 
power’. Class differences and popular mobilisation and organisation are of 
import only insofar as they tie into populist leaders’ strategies for seeking 
and maintaining power. Secondly, based on this supposition of populist 
leaders’ thirst for power, neopopulists adapted to neoliberalism purely 
because it served those purposes, and not because of any ideological affinity 
they may have had with it. Ideologies, therefore, are simply sets of policies 
assumed by populist leaders to ensure their power, and, hence, can equally 
be discarded at will. Thirdly, Weyland maintains that neopopulists will 
continue to emerge and will remain tied to neoliberalism as it is the only 
possible option in the current context for them to maintain power. Populist 
leaders in this conception therefore are archetypical ‘utility maximisers’ 
devoid of ideology or class loyalty.  
In a more recent article Roberts echoes many of Weyland’s points, but in a 
more subtle and nuanced manner (Roberts, 2006). Roberts’s thesis revolves 
around the impact of elite resistance to socio-economic change on the depth 
and extent of popular mobilisation and organisation in populist movements. 
In effect Roberts is attempting to “explain why populism takes divergent 
organizational forms in different national settings or stages of 
socioeconomic and political development” (Roberts, 2006:128). Using 
Fujimori and Chávez as case studies, Roberts argument is as follows: 
Populist leaders eschew or create popular organisations in function of their 
need to survive politically. If elite resistance is likely populist leaders will 
mobilise and organise followers for ‘political combat’. If on the other hand 
little elite resistance is expected, due to, for example, reforms being of a 
neoliberal variety, then popular organisations will not be used by the leaders. 
Mass organisation therefore emerges solely as a ‘utility maximisation’ tactic 
on the part of the leader to gain and maintain power and the extent of 
organisation is simply contingent on the degree of resistance expected from 
elites.  
In Weyland’s and Roberts’s conceptions of populism, there is an 
overemphasis of the power hunger of the leader and the subservience of the 
‘masses’ to the leader’s power strategies at the expense of popular 
protagonism and ideology. The existence or not of popular organisation and 
the ideological colour of the populist movement are mere mechanisms 
which serve the perpetuation of the leader’s power.  Their accounts 
therefore are underpinned by ‘utility maximisation’ explanations for leader 
and follower actions drawn from rational choice theory. In order thus to 
examine the limits of this perspective, in the next section we will look at 
what Green and Shapiro call the ‘pathologies of rational choice theory’.  
 
Populism and the ‘Pathologies of Rational Choice 
Theory’  
 
The limits of rational choice theory 
Rational choice theory is based on a number of key assumptions, according 
to Green and Shapiro (1994). The first is that people act rationally when 
they attempt to achieve ‘utility maximisation’ in what they do. That is that 
we human beings will usually do what we think will best serve our 
objectives, whatever they may be. A further assumption is that the relevant 
maximising agents are individuals. Collective action is simply the action of 
individuals when they choose to achieve their objectives collectively rather 
than individually – but the objectives remain those of the individual in 
league with others with similar individualised objectives. A major task then 
of rational choice theory is to explain collective outcomes by reference to 
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the maximising actions of individuals. A further important assumption for 
our present purposes is that rational choice theory aspires to be universal 
and interpersonal variations are ‘assumed away’. As we have seen, all 
individuals act to achieve what they judge to be in their own individual best 
interests. Even when they act collectively to achieve what could be called ‘a 
greater good’- say universal health care – it is presumed that they do so in 
order to improve their own individual lives primarily and not those of 
others.  
 These assumptions present some difficulties for rational choice 
theorists. One difficulty is that the assumption that all individuals act in 
order to maximise their own benefit, is contradicted by the fact that people 
vote in large numbers despite the fact that there is little statistical chance 
that their vote will directly benefit their lives. Furthermore, individuals do 
act collectively despite knowing that the goal could be achieved without 
their participation, and hence they could benefit from it with no effort on 
their part. In both cases rational choice theory has posited that it is more 
rational for the individual to ‘free-ride’, that is to do nothing, as one 
individual cannot, logically speaking have a decisive impact on the outcome, 
but can still benefit from a positive outcome nonetheless. Despite this, 
however, in both cases millions of people do vote and do participate in 
collective actions, undermining the rational choice theorists’ assertions to 
the contrary. Green and Shapiro therefore justifiably claim that: “Neither in 
voter turnout nor in collective action problems has the incentive to free-ride 
been established by rational choice theory as the causal mechanisms 
inhibiting mass behaviour” (ibid: 96).  
A further observation they make, which is useful for our discussion, is on 
the use by rational choice theorists of other sets of theory to cover 
phenomena which cannot be explained by rational choice. In other words in 
these cases rational choice abandons its claims to universality. “One cannot 
have it both ways”, they claim, meaning that rational choice analysts must 
decide that rational choice theory is universal or that it is not. These 
attempts to cover anomalies in rational choice reasoning may indeed be 
examples of method driven rather than problem driven research, which 
undermines the validity of its findings. Indeed, the authors claim, that much 
of rational choice theory rather than thriving in fields providing abundant 
data – such as in voter turnout – are more prevalent in areas where evidence 
about the preferences and strategic reasoning of policy makers is difficult to 
discern even in retrospect, such as in international relations, undermining 
even more their claims for its universality (ibid: 196).  
In the end the authors advise that rational choice theorists should relinquish 
the commitment to pure universalism and the discrediting or absorption of 
competing theoretical accounts. Instead rational choice theorists should aim 
to make a clearer distinction between rational choice actions and other 
modes of behaviour, designing more convincing and informative empirical 
tests which probe the limits of what rational choice can explain.  
These ‘pathologies in rational choice theory’, I would contend, limit the 
explanatory power of the institutionalist perspective. As we have seen in our 
brief review above of the two articles on populism above, the main basis of 
the perspective is on the actions of one individual, ‘the leader’, and the basis 
of his or her action is seen exclusively in terms of the leader’s ‘thirst for 
power’. In this article, I do not seek to dismiss the possibility that leaders do 
have such a drive – far from it. Nonetheless, I would also venture to say that 
there is a need to examine other equally crucial aspects in politics to help 
analyse and explain complex phenomena such as populism, most specifically 
the role of ideology both in the causation of conflict and polarisation, and in 
the creation of specific populist movements. As Susan Stokes points out, 
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politicians have beliefs and these beliefs come from broader ideological 
structures, which rational choice theory has limited power to explain 
(Stokes, 2006:192-3). In the end one must examine the nature of beliefs and 
in this context we should instead look at the role of ideology in the 
formation of populist movements, which the remainder of this article will 
attempt to do. Firstly it will provide an alternative account for distinctions in 
populist organisation from a Marxist perspective, placing ideology at its 
centre, and secondly it will use chavismo and fujimorismo as case studies to 
help prove this theory.  
 
Ideology, people and leader in the formation of 
populist movements 
In this section, concentrating specifically on Laclau’s (2005a, 2005b) theories 
on populism, we will firstly explore the concept of the people within 
populism, showing the centrality of discourse and antagonism in the 
construction of popular identities and that, contrary to the institutionalist 
perspective leader and people are not distinct entities but can in effect be 
viewed as one. I will argue that this ‘populist logic’, as Laclau terms it, is not 
linked to a specific ideology, but rather is a political ‘logic’, a way of doing 
politics, but that unlike in Weyland’s conception, this political logic is used 
by politicians in support of differing ideological projects and not just in 
support of the leader’s ‘thirst for power’. The nature and extent of political 
organisation will depend therefore on the content and aims of that political 
project, in other words on its ideological make up, rather than on ‘utility 
maximisation’ strategies of either elite or ‘masses’ as put forward by 
institutionalist readings of populism.  
 
The people and the leader  
In On Populist Reason, Laclau (2005a: 68) argues that the 'people' are 
defined through the discourse of the leader. By discourse Laclau does not 
simply refer to language that is to speech and writings, but also to the 
relations built up between the different elements of a populist movement. A 
first step in building up this relationship is an ‘appeal to the people’ by the 
populist leader. The main objective of the ‘appeal to the people’ is to isolate 
the established institutions and establish a direct unmediated relationship 
between the populist leader and the people. It is through these appeals that 
the entity of the ‘people’ is defined in each individual populist episode.  
Again like Weyland (2003), Laclau argues, that antagonism is used by 
leaders, but in Laclau’s case the process of ‘antagonism’ is used to define the 
‘people’. Laclau maintains that there are three moments in the formation of 
the ‘people’. Firstly there must be a plurality of democratic demands being 
put forward to the government which remain unsatisfied. These demands 
coalesce to form an equivalential chain of popular demands that is that each 
demand become of equal weight while maintaining its particularity. 
Secondly, the leader, through discourse, divides society into two camps, 
what Laclau calls the ‘people/power bloc’ dichotomy. The relationship 
between both camps is one of antagonism, as the people reject the status 
quo and seek out new forms of representation.  
But who are ‘the people’? The people are not so much a coalition of 
identities, as portrayed by many analysts, but rather invest their diverse 
identities into one privileged identity.  Laclau illustrates this with the 
distinction between the people as populus, the body of all citizens, and as 
plebs, the underprivileged. The ‘people’ of populism comes about when the 
plebs come to represent the populus – “that is, a partiality which wants to 
function as the totality of the community” (Ibid: 81).  
 5 
Central to this process of construction of the ‘people’ is the role of the 
leader. Populist leaders, as we have seen in the accounts reviewed, are 
portrayed as strong, charismatic, and paternalistic macho men, with an 
autocratic, authoritarian bent. They are seen as 'outsiders' and are portrayed 
as manipulative of the ‘people’, autocratic, power hungry and ambitious. 
Laclau, however, resists attributing the prominence of the leader in populist 
movements to these characteristics. As we have seen, for him, populism is a 
chain of demands whose unity is expressed through one element of those 
demands (the plebs). In other words the totality is expressed through a 
singularity and the extreme form of a singularity is an individuality. The 
group then, the totality of the populus, becomes symbolically unified around 
an individuality, in this case the leader. The ‘leader’ therefore “is inherent in 
the formation of a ‘people’ (ibid: 100). ‘Leader’ and ‘people’ are one, two 
sides of the same phenomenon in a populist formation and the relationship 
between the leader and the people and the other elements of the leader’s 
discourse are formulated through the filter of ideology. It is to how ideology 
relates to populism that we now turn.  
 
Ideology and Populism 
Up until relatively recently populism was generally accepted as linked to a set 
of economic policies which emphasised growth and redistribution to the 
detriment of fiscal rectitude, thus ignoring risks of inflation, and followed a 
policy of ISI, as both Weyland and Roberts point out.  They were seen by 
some as 'fiscally irresponsible' policies and were blamed for the economic 
crises of the 1980s.i Others, however, show us that these policies were not 
uniform,ii and others still point out that state intervention was quite 
acceptable globally during this period.iii As such these policies cannot be 
taken in isolation as indicative of populism, nor as the sole cause of the 
crises of the 1980’s in Latin America.  
The re-emergence of populist, or neopopulist, regimes in the late 1980’s and 
in the 1990’s, often in tandem with neoliberal restructuring policies, forced 
analysts to reconsider this orthodox view of populism.  Neoliberal 
restructuring policies were, it was said, incompatible with traditional or 
classical populism, yet it was clear that the new breed of leaders in Latin 
America, such as Fujimori in Peru, Collor in Brazil, and Menem in 
Argentina, amongst others, were using populist strategies to achieve and 
maintain power.  As we have seen Weyland, in the article reviewed above, 
argued that populism, or 'neopopulism' as he termed this new phase, had 
certain underlying affinities with neoliberalism.iv 
It can also be argued, however, that as 'classical' populism was as much a 
product of a supportive state-led international political economy context, so 
contemporary populism is a product of a globalised neoliberal age. Populism 
therefore cannot be identified with a specific ideology, but rather can adapt 
itself to a variety of ideologies or mix of ideologies, and can be found within 
a wide range of socio-political and geopolitical contexts.  
This is in line with what Weyland (2003) and Roberts (2006) also maintain. 
Nonetheless, in this article the argument is that differing ideological 
outlooks can give distinctly different flavours to different populist regimes, 
but no one ideology is in itself populist. Institutionalists regularly 
differentiate between different types of populism – be it ‘classical’ populism 
and neopopulism - to explain these different types of populist regimes. Yet 
this separation of ‘movement’ and ‘ideology’, with for example Weyland’s 
separation of neopopulism and neoliberalism in the article reviewed, is a 
false one, as it separates artificially the ideas in people’s heads and the 
actions in which they participate. Hence, it logically follows that a populist 
movement which is articulated to socialism will tend towards denser 
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organisational networks than one articulated to neoliberalism. What unites 
these populisms is a fluidity of discourse which emphasises concepts of 
popular sovereignty, which is “always going to be imprecise and fluctuating” 
(Laclau 2005: 118); what divides them is how to achieve that, the shape, 
construction and density of the populist movement which will give physical 
and programmatic shape to this discourse, and it is here that ideology comes 
into play. Let us now turn to our examination of the Fujimori and Chávez 
regimes to illustrate this case.  
 
Discourse and Ideology in the Fujimori and 
Chávez presidencies 
Before examining these two populist governments, let us briefly recap on 
the main points of our discussion so far. The essence of populism according 
to Laclau is the construction of populist identities through antagonistic 
discourse, with the antagonism directed normally at the existing institutional 
status quo in a given territory. Such populist logic in politics can be used in 
support of any ideology or mix of ideologies, but, and here we depart from 
Laclau, the shape and substance of the populist movement will be heavily 
influenced by the nature of these ideologies to which the populist 
movement is articulated.  
In the following two sub-sections we will examine the regimes of Alberto 
Fujimori of Peru and Hugo Chávez of Venezuela. These examinations will 
concentrate on the following areas: the creation of popular identities 
through discourse, the ideologies, or mix of ideologies with which both 
regimes were articulated and how these influence the organisational natures 
of these respective populist movements. 
 
Fujimorismo: ‘el poder soy yo’ 
 
Introduction 
One of the central claims made by Roberts in another article is that 
fujimorismo is “a paradigmatic case of electoral populism”. Fujimori chose 
this path, according to Roberts, because he had successfully ‘neutralised’ 
elite opposition, obviating the need for popular organisation (Roberts, 
2005:137). In this section I will argue that far from ‘neutralising’ elite 
opposition, there was little of that opposition to begin with, and 
furthermore Fujimori was not at all ‘autonomous’ but fully in alliance with, 
and dependent on, the military, the international financial community, and 
Peru’s transnationalised elite, including international corporations. Through 
an historical account of the regime, I will show how Fujimori used populist 
discourse to install an authoritarian, technocratic regime which implemented 
a highly ideologically driven neoliberal model.    
 
El Chino and his cholosv 
Peru, in 1990 was experiencing one of its most profound crises after decades 
of tumultuous change. The disastrous regime of Alan García (1985-1990 and 
current president since 2006) left a legacy of increased unemployment, 
poverty, hyperinflation and a worsening guerrilla war against the Maoist 
Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path). Fujimori's discursive message for the 
1990 election campaign was centre-left, advocating a negotiated gradualist 
form of change, based on national aspirations and dialogue, and presented in 
alliance with a coalition of evangelicals and small business people from the 
shanty towns.  This contrasted greatly with his rival presidential candidate, 
Mario Vargas Llosa who advocated a neoliberal, ‘shock therapy’ economic 
package.  
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Peruvians rejected this policy offer and the white, patrician Vargas Llosa in 
favour of Fujimori’s more centralist message and cholo (mixed race) allies. 
Once in power, however, he quickly abandoned these policy positions and 
this alliance, and begun to implement a swift neoliberal programme, 
constructing a high powered alliance with the Armed Forces, the 
international financial community, the elites of the core capitalist countries, 
especially the United States, and a close circle of advisors (Cameron, 1997; 
Rochabrún, 1996).  Cambio 90, never a movement in the sense of having 
militants and an organic national structure, became a mere label under which 
the President constructed an electoral vehicle and a set of legislators who 
would owe their loyalty to him and him alone.  
The changing of alliances was accompanied by the so-called fujishock, a 
draconian set of neoliberal economic measures announced in August 1990, 
barely a month after having taken presidential office. As a result of these 
economic measures the number of people living in poverty jumped from 9 
to 14 million, in a country of 22 million inhabitants (Rochabrún, 1996:17). 
The effect of these measures was felt not only in the increase in poverty and 
unemployment, but also in exacerbating the already advanced 
decomposition of civil society and its ability to resist such authoritarian 
impositions and articulate a coherent collective response. 
Despite his movement being in a minority in both houses, Fujimori 
managed to get most of his legislative programme approved and was given 
extraordinary decree powers to facilitate the speed of legislative change. Yet 
this consensus and co-operation was responded to by Fujimori with an anti-
system discourse attacking the very parties and institutions which were co-
operating with him.  In a number of speeches he attacked Congress 
members and the judiciary. Meanwhile he reinforced negative images of the 
Peruvian political elite and democratic institutions and built up a deeper 
rapport with the people based on a populist discourse which as Sánchez 
comments, presents itself “as anti-politics, as a suspension of competition 
for a reason of primordial importance: the defence of the State" (Sánchez, 
2000:210).  
It is important to note, however, that it was this discourse which created 
resistance in the parliamentary elite not the overall content of the neoliberal 
programme. The difficulty was that the neoliberal programme had to be 
implemented swiftly and Fujimori and his new alliance knew that in the 
notoriously slow Peruvian legislative system, where Fujimori’s movement 
was in a minority, that this would take too much time.   As a result Fujimori 
engineered numerous disagreements between legislature and executive 
giving the impression of a Congress which frustrated and blocked the 
President (Kenney, 1996).  
The greatest row developed over the decree powers given to the President in 
June 1991. Fujimori promulgated 117 decrees between June and November, 
and Congress refused approval or changed 28 of those, mostly to do with 
pacification but also with financial matters including privatisation of 
educational services and mining companies (Kenney, 1996:94).vi From the 
beginning then we see a President liberally using decree powers intent on 
implementing swingeing neoliberal measures. A case was rapidly building for 
the abolition of the democratic institutions which were increasingly being 
seen as irrelevant. As Fujimori’s stature grew support for authoritarianism 
was also rising, standing at 22% in September 1991 (Carrión, 1996:297). vii 
Antagonism and autogolpe  
On the evening of 5 April 1992, the President announced his autogolpe 
(self-coup), followed up by a statement of support from the joint command 
of the Armed Forces. Tanks were placed outside the Palace of Justice and 
Congress, legislatures were closed, key legislators detained, and key media 
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outlets occupied. The following day the government issued a decree 
establishing an emergency government which would execute a ten point 
plan to pacify, rebuild and develop the country.viii In his address to the 
nation on April 5, Fujimori had no doubt who was to blame for blocking 
the march of progress and reconstruction being carried out by his 
government: "The present democratic formality is deceptive, false; its 
institutions too often serve the interests of all privileged groups […] 
Without a doubt neither the Parliament, nor the Judicial Power are agents of 
change nowadays, but rather obstacles to transformation and progress". It is 
for him Fujimori, backed by "the great national majorities", to take up the 
challenge of the "profound transformation of the State and its institutions, 
so that they may become true motors of development and social justice" 
(Fujimori, 1992a: no page number).  
In speeches on the Peruvian national holiday, 28th July of the same year, the 
antagonistic polarised lines are clearly drawn (ibid). As Sánchez comments, 
on one side "…a reflexive president, unambitious, honest, hard working, 
responsible, just like other citizens and a people waiting, sacrificing, who 
know the truth; both waiting for a justice beyond the law. In the other bloc 
[…] are the politicians and the institutions mired in corruption and 
irresponsibility, who self-interestedly use the Constitution and the law to 
evade justice" (Sánchez,2000: 211). As Panfichi and Sanborn (1996:42) 
observe Fujimori “looked to deinstitutionalise the norms of political co-
existence and personalise the expectations of the masses in his person".  
Fujimori tirelessly promoted himself as a man of the people, dressing up in 
traditional garb and constantly visiting the most remote parts of this 
enormous country (Oliart, 1996:19). President Fujimori showed that he was 
neither afraid of Peru, nor had Peruvians reason to be afraid of him. By 
visiting marginalised areas Fujimori reassured poor Peruvians with two 
convincing messages: "I am where you are" and "I am a president like you" 
(Grompone, 1998:21). However, Oliart warns that:  
[I]n general, Fujimori symbolically fulfils the strong desire of Peru's 
historically excluded majorities to be included in the political system. He 
does not, however, pretend to incorporate the poor in governmental 
decision-making, or even to encourage them to strengthen their own self-
help organisations. The style of his presidency - coupled with the substance 
of his economic and social policies - reassures the upper classes that his 
government will protect their interests. At no time does Fujimori's 
relationship with his country's impoverished majority threaten the status quo 
(op cit: 19). 
 
Neoliberalismo a secasix 
Indeed, while Fujimori was constructing this image of a man of the people, 
with the support of most of the media, his government was rapidly 
dismantling the old economic order, destroying the few protections the 
popular classes possessed. The financial sector was totally liberalized 
favouring multinational and privatised companies, foreign creditors and 
imports, but working against local industry and agriculture (Pascó-Font and 
Saavedra, 2001:64). Banks were privatized and sold to foreign corporations, 
resulting in a bonanza for the top earners, but for the majority of Peruvians, 
credit facilities remained out of reach (ibid:201). By 1999, public companies 
had been sold off to the value of US$8,917.1 million, and private companies 
were increasingly involved in electricity and water provision and distribution, 
either through ownership of companies or through contracts (ibid:90–91). 
Prices rose as a result. 
Employment in Peru during the Fujimori years was characterised principally 
by underemployment, casualisation and informalisation of the workforce, 
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lower pay and more precarious conditions for the bulk of Peruvian workers. 
Unemployment and underemployment increased slightly, with the latter 
affecting around three-quarters of the workforce. Temporary contract work 
doubled during the decade, as formal employment decreased to over half the 
EAP.x Strikes declined, as there was a notable movement of resources from 
workers to capital.xi Employment moved from larger manufacturing firms 
and agriculture to commerce, restaurants and hotels (Abugattas, 1998:71; 
Pascó Font and Saavedra, 2001:150). In sum, as Gonzales puts it, there was 
"…a rise in independent workers, a reduction of public and industrial 
employment, and stagnation of rural employment…In general there is a 
stagnation of salaries for the labour force, and a tendency to inequality of 
remuneration and a greater uncertainty in labour stability" (Gonzales 
1998:117).  
It was primarily an authoritarian governmental model which facilitated this, 
which through the anti-status quo discourse against the institutions of the 
country, was met with resounding public approval.xii Through the coup 
Fujimori established full control over all the apparatus of state, which he 
never lost until he finally removed himself from power in 2001.xiii 
Neoliberal policies of privatisation, structural reforms and the reduction of 
the State under Carlos Boloña as Minister of Finance (1991-1993) were 
implemented more speedily and, due to the autogolpe, with virtually no 
opposition.xiv From February 1991 to December 1992, Boloña, 
implemented 923 decree laws. International opposition was tepid to say the 
least, with Fujimori managing to dispel the little there was at an OEA 
meeting in the Bahamas in May 1992, by promising elections for a 
Constituent Assembly for the following November.   
In sum, while discourse had set the context in which the autogolpe received 
popular approval, it was the autogolpe, which sealed the primacy of Fujimori 
as hegemonic ruler of Peru. Fujimori’s new grouping Cambio 90/Nueva 
Mayoría (Change 90/New Majority) had few links with the grassroots or the 
previous fujimorista electoral grouping, consisting of ex-ministers, 
ministerial assessors, and associated businessmen and women (Planas, 
1996:195). They had little problem winning most seats in the Constituent 
Assembly and wasted little time in drawing up a Constitution designed to 
permanently install a neoliberal, centralised model of state.  
Adrianzén described the 1993 Constitution as "conservative, privatist, 
authoritarian and ideological" (Adrianzén, 1993:10). According to this 
analyst it was conservative due its eradication of explicit paragraphs 
guaranteeing solidarity and egalitarian principles for all groups. It was 
privatist due to the elimination or relativisation of social rights in health, 
housing, education, and work, its explicit prohibition of State participation 
in economic activity, and in its granting of greater rights to business than to 
workers. It was authoritarian in its accentuation of presidential and military 
prerogatives, the President being allowed to dissolve parliament, control 
senior Armed Forces promotions, decide exclusively on public spending, 
and crucially allowing presidential re-election. Representation was drastically 
curtailed, and centralisation in the executive even further advanced, with the 
reduction of Parliament to one chamber and the practical elimination of 
regionalization. Finally Adrianzén argues the Constitution was ideological in 
that it provided a model of society entirely based on the ideology of the 
market and private interest, giving for example free competition full 
constitutional guarantees and thus "legitimising and legalising the 
implantation of a savage capitalism" (Adrianzén, 1992).  
In every sphere the balance between State and markets was altered in favour 
of the latter. The State was relegated constitutionally to the role of regulator 
and promoter of private business activity, and prohibited from acting as 
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capitalist investor in the economy. In the social sphere, the State pursued a 
policy of poverty relief, increasing social spending. Fujimori's room for 
manoeuvre to distribute goods was limited, however, to welfare 
programmes, making his presidency essentially assistentialist and clientelistic. 
Furthermore, these programmes were controlled primarily by the markets 
and IFIs, as most of the revenue paying for them came from privatisation 
receipts and international credits. Moreover, the private sector and not for 
profit sector was given a stronger role in welfare, health and education 
provision.  
The hegemony of neoliberalism was further secured through a mostly 
compliant, corrupt media, providing consensus opinions on the benefits of 
the markets which did not seriously question the new orthodoxy. Education 
too was increasingly privatised. In this way, culturally Peruvians were being 
trained to accept the primacy of the market as the 'natural' order of things.  
Far from eradicating opposition from the elites to his plans, Fujimori 
secured the position of transnational elites against those involved in national 
production, while destroying any possibility of organized resistance from the 
popular classes. Popular organization was not eschewed by Fujimori 
therefore due to elite resistance but because it was antithetical to the 
implantation of this neoliberal model which depended on an authoritarian 
and centralized state.  
In this Fujimori was not unusual; other so called neopopulists implemented 
neoliberal SAPs in similar fashions. As Laclau (2006) points out this was a 
continuation of a policy inherited from the preceding authoritarian period, 
whereby neoliberal programmes were applied through authoritarianism in 
which “social repression and deinstitutionalization were the conditions for 
the implementation of social adjustment policies”. He goes on to cite 
Menem in Argentina, trade union repression in Bolivia in 1985, anti-terrorist 
legislation in Colombia, and Carlos Andres Perez’s repression of the 
caracazo in 1989 in Venezuela (see below) alongside Fujimori as examples of 
this (ibid:59). Fujimori’s neoliberalism therefore was not simply a means to 
secure power, as institutionalist readings suggest – it was to radically alter the 
nature of the Peruvian economic and social model and was deeply 
ideological in its intent. This profound neoliberal restructuring of Peruvian 
society and economy as we have seen had devastating effects on Peru’s once 
vibrant social movements and were the determining factor in the anti-
popular formation of the fujimorista ‘movement’.  
The next section will examine similar tactics on the level of discourse in the 
emergence and consolidation of the Chávez regime in Venezuela, but in 
order to implement an anti-neoliberal, socially progressive socio-economic 
model based on principles of participative democracy as opposed to the 
anti-popular, elite led, neoliberal model of Fujimori.  
 
Hugo Chávez: "Con Chávez Manda el Pueblo" xv 
 
Introduction 
As we have seen, Roberts (2006) claims that: “The depth of socio-political 
organization by populist leaders is contingent on the level and character of 
the political conflicts triggered by their social reforms. Mass organization is 
first and foremost a political instrument for mobilizing the weight of 
numbers against elite actors who derive political power from their strategic 
economic or institutional location” (Roberts, 2006:144: my italics). 
Chavismo, for Roberts is a paradigmatic case of this. This section, however, 
will prove that grassroots organisation in the case of chavismo is not ‘first 
and foremost’ to defend social reforms against elite actors threatened by 
such measures, as Roberts maintains. Popular organisation is rather, I argue, 
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the very raison de ser of bolivarianismo. It is the cornerstone of the 
participatory democracy which underpins Bolivarian philosophy and 
ideology. It does not ‘defend’ the reforms, it enacts and implements them – 
it is the very embodiment of the reforms themselves.  
To prove this I will firstly examine Bolivarian ideology, showing how the 
concept of the people as a full participant actor in government is central to 
its philosophy. I will then examine and assess how that ideology is put into 
practice by the Venezuelan government, and show how a distinct anti-
neoliberal model is being formed which is looking for new ways, as Mouffe 
(2005:70) puts it in another context, to advance “the struggle for another 
globalisation”.    
 
Bolivarianismo and the Left 
Bolivarianismo emerged from the revolutionary leftist tradition which 
developed in resistance to the Perez Jimenez dictatorship (1948-58) and later 
to the Puntofijo (1958-1998) democratic regime, from which the left was 
initially excluded. Chávez had contact with many stalwarts of leftist and 
guerrilla movements before coming to power, often through his brother 
Adánxvi, and many of these would later serve in the Chávez 
government.xvii Indeed the revolutionary tradition goes far back into 
Chávez’s family as his grandfather was Maisanta or General Pedro Peréz 
Delgado (1881-1924), a colourful guerrilla leader and local caudillo. The 
revolutionary and leftist tradition, therefore, was firmly established within 
Chavez’s political vision from the beginning.  
Moreover, Chávez’s military experiences reinforced and encouraged this 
leftist vision. The Venezuelan military had a strong egalitarian tradition 
(Müller Rojas, 2001:17). It had socially progressive policies, such as social 
mobility for young men from poorer sectors, and liberal educational 
programmes, such as the Andrés Bello Plan, introduced in 1971 allowing 
future officers the opportunity to take civilian degrees in Venezuela's 
universities (López Maya, 2003:76).xviii Such educational plans facilitated a 
greater awareness of social situations of the poorer sectors amongst army 
personnel, especially in a context of crisis, and greater association with 
civilians (ibid.).     
In 1982 Chávez began to organise the clandestine military organization 
MBR-200 with fellow officers with considerable success numerically. The 
caracazo of February 1989, where the military, under the second 
government of Carlos Andrés Peréz (1989-1993), were used to suppress 
anti-neoliberal protests resulting in the death of up to 3,000 people, 
encouraged many more soldiers to seek out and join the MBR-200. Contacts 
with civilian groups, as described above, intensified as disenchantment with 
the Punto Fijo regime amongst all sectors grew in the wake of the caracazo, 
and these groups sought solutions and alternatives more urgently, to the 
economic decline of Venezuela and the neoliberal programmes being put in 
place by Carlos Andrés Pérez (Gott, 2001:62-63). The MBR-200 therefore 
grew within a general context of dissatisfaction with the existing regime and 
an active seeking of alternatives by most sectors of Venezuelan society 
(Müller Rojas, 2001:27).  
Venezuela during the 1980s and 1990s was experiencing one of its most 
profound crises since the founding of the puntofijista state. Living standards 
had plummeted due to the collapse in oil prices, with Venezuela’s human 
development index falling from 0.8210 in 1990 to 0.7046 in 1996 
(PNUD/OCEI, 2001:92), the country’s middle class declining from 40% to 
10% of the population in the same period and income inequality increasing 
(World Bank, 2001: 283). After the caracazo, street protest became the norm 
in the country, as people lost faith in the country’s institutional 
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arrangements.  In 1992 around 60 % of Venezuelans had a negative image 
of political parties and almost 40 % had a negative opinion on the 
constitutional arrangement (Njaim, Combellas and Alvarez, 1998:17 and 99-
100). Voting abstention reached around 40% in the same year, up from an 
astonishing low of 3% in 1973 (Mc Coy and Smith, 1995:137).  
This crisis made all the more urgent a move for change, prompting the MBR 
to carry out a coup against the Peréz government on February 4, 1992, 
which was seen to be corrupt, autocratic and excessively neoliberal. While 
the coup failed overall, it did bring Chávez to national attention. Chávez 
requested a short television appearance to advise his colleagues to lay down 
their arms and this brief, instantly famous television appearance by Chávez 
created a new hero amongst the popular classes. A further failed coup in 
November of the same year, this time amongst the upper ranks of the Air 
Force and Navy led by Admiral Hernán Grüber, would mortally wound the 
Peréz government, leading to the president's eventual impeachment and 
further encouraging pressure for change.  
In sum, leftist ideology and philosophy has a great influence not only on 
Chávez but also on the majority of the officers and soldiers involved in 
conspiring to overthrow the Peréz regime. The decomposition of the 
puntofijo regime under the weight of the profound systems crisis which 
developed during the 1980s radicalized sectors of the military and other 
elements of Venezuelan society, such as sections of the trade union 
movement, rejecting neoliberalism. But how did this leftism crystallize itself 
into bolivarianismo? The next section will look at Bolivarian ideology more 
closely.  
 
Bolivarian ideology and discourse 
The MBR-200's ideology, formed particularly after the 1992 coup, was 
designed to provide a system of thinking specifically Venezuelan and Latin 
American, rather than one based on imported ideologies.  The MBR-200 
turned to the thinking and teachings of three major figures from Venezuelan 
history to form the concept of the "three rooted tree": Ezequiel Zamora and 
Símon Rodríguez, educator, friend and mentor to the final member of the 
trinity, the Liberator, Símon Bolívar.  Each figure provided a specific 
element to the new ideology: Zamora the element of rebellion, popular 
protest and protagonism, summed up in the slogan attributed to him: "Land 
and free men! Popular elections! Horror to the oligarchy!"  Rodríguez, the 
requirement for autochthonous ideological originality when he warned that 
"either we invent or we commit errors (…) America should not servilely 
imitate, but be original"; and Bolívar, the Liberator, the symbol of 
equilibrium between the dualism of rebellion and ideology, force and 
consent (MBR-200/Pirela Romero, 1994).   
Central and crucial to this ideology is the concept of 'el pueblo', the people.  
Chávez qualified "popular protagonism as the fuel of history" (Chávez Frías, 
1994: 3) and only when this protagonism exists is a people truly el pueblo.  
"A people exist when they share customs and an effective process of 
communication exists between them (…) a collective spirit and a 
consciousness of the social, or the common existence" (ibid: 4). The 
Venezuelan people specifically are a true people, a people who have shown, 
and are capable once again of greatness (Chávez Frías, 2000: 21).  
Leadership is vital to achieve the necessary protagonism lying dormant in 
the people, so that they become a people actively struggling. Chávez, 
however, rejects the notion of the caudillo, the leader/masses model put 
forward by many of his critics.xix  Leadership must be provided in order to 
galvanise the collective into action, but the leader is but a conduit.  The 
people are an "unleashed force, equal to the rivers" being channelled by 
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leaders such as Chávez because either "we provide a course for that force, or 
that force will pass over us" (ibid: 17).  Chávez is "not a cause, but a 
consequence" (ibid: 18), "an instrument of the collective" (ibid: 23), 
reversing the conceptions of analysts such as Roberts.  Leadership is 
multiple and is part of a greater movement, in which "there is a leadership 
which has been extending on a number of levels, there is a popular force, 
there are some very strong parties, there are institutions; it would be a sad 
revolutionary or political process which depended on one man (…)" 
(Chávez interviewed in Rojas, 2004).This vision contrasts greatly with that 
of Fujimori who created a unique closeness between leader and people to 
the exclusion of all others.   
Puntofijismo was but another version of the same old model based "on 
imposition, on domination, on exploitation, and on extermination" (Chávez 
in MBR-200, 1996: 4). The most recent incarnations of the model, in the 
presidencies of Pérez (1989-1993) and Caldera (1993-1998) were simply part 
of a wider neoliberal offensive throughout Latin America (ibid: 5). Once 
again, as with Fujimori, the lines are clearly drawn between the ‘people’ as 
underdog and the powerful political and business elites. Chávez, 
nonetheless, offers a more epic version of this dichotomy placing it firmly 
within a sweeping historical vision of class struggle and not centring it 
simply on his person. Instead of the status quo, the MVR and the Chávez 
government offer an alternative which is fundamentally political placing the 
social above the economic, and which seeks to be Venezuelan and Latin 
American in its ideology and practice.   
The Bolivarian doctrine is a doctrine in construction, a heterogeneous 
amalgam of thoughts and ideologies, from universal thought, capitalism, 
Marxism, but rejecting the neoliberal models currently being imposed in 
Latin America and the discredited socialist and communist models of the 
old Soviet Bloc (Blanco Muñoz, 1998). Initially Chávez presented this new 
model as firmly capitalist, not "savage neoliberal capitalism" but "capitalism 
with another face, with other mechanisms [which] (…) is equitable and gets 
to all Venezuelans” (Chávez in Croes, 1999). On January 30, 2005, however, 
in a speech to the 5th World Social Forum, Chávez announced that he 
supported the creation of Twenty-First Century Socialism in Venezuela, a 
“socialism [that] would be different from the socialism of the twentieth 
century […][it would] not be a state socialism as was practiced in the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe or as is practiced in Cuba today. Rather, it would 
be a socialism that would be more pluralistic and less state-centred” 
(Wilpert, 2006; no page number).   
According to Wilpert, three factors play a crucial part in the building of this 
new Twenty-First Century Socialism: “the tremendous oil revenues, the 
creation of a more participatory democracy, and the ‘civilizing’ of the 
military” (2006, no page number). As a result of these three factors “the 
Chavez government is far freer to pursue policies that are independent of 
the powerful private interests… clearly moving away from private 
ownership and control over the means of production, away from market-
determined allocation and distribution, and towards what could be called 
more socialist economic and governance forms…[but] a more libertarian 
form of socialism, in that it actively seeks citizen participation and even 
forms of direct democracy” (ibid.). The next section will examine these 
forms of direct democracy in more detail, arguing that their function is to 
fulfil these ideological ends rather than “first and foremost” to defend the 
Bolivarian revolution against elite attacks, as Roberts maintains, or to 
support the power hunger of the leader as Weyland would have it.  
Structure and organisation of bolivararianismo 
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Popular participation and organization are the cornerstones of the 
Bolivarian revolution, as stated above. But how does this participation 
manifest itself in Venezuela? Wilpert (ibid.) identifies three ways which 
Venezuela guarantees popular participation thus limiting and controlling the 
negative impacts of capitalism.  
Firstly, Wilpert identifies a clear movement towards the transformation of 
the ownership of production away from private interests and towards more 
citizen control. The Bolivarian government has increased almost one 
hundred fold the number of cooperatives working in Venezuela. In 2005 
there were 100,000 cooperatives established involving almost 10% of the 
country’s adult population. Co-management arrangements between the state 
and workers have been implemented in some state-owned enterprises, such 
as CADAFE the electricity company. Idle factories have been expropriated 
and handed over to their workers; in 2006 four were in worker control with 
up to 700 being evaluated. The Chávez government set up new state 
enterprises in telecommunications, air travel, petrochemicals and reasserted 
its control over the state oil company PDVSA, using its revenues to fund 
social programmes.  
 Secondly, the Chávez government is redistributing wealth through a 
wide variety of social programmes and urban and rural land reform. Gibbs 
(2006: 272) reports that in its first 18 months, the Barrio Adentro (Into the 
Neigbourhood) health mission made services available to 17 million 
Venezuelans and provides medicines at an 85% discount. Education 
missions have seen a 90% reduction in Venezuela’s illiteracy rate (ibid: 274). 
Citizen participation is facilitated through health committees, land 
committees and educational task forces which direct these missions. 
Furthermore, through the Bolivarian Circles local people have input to 
community projects and have workshops to discuss government reforms 
and strategies for making the process sustainable (ibid.). More latterly all of 
these are being replaced with the new popularly elected and run ‘community 
councils’ – consejos comunales. 
 The Bolivarian Constitution was drafted with extensive citizen 
input and facilitates it further in many of its clauses. García-Gaudilla (2003) 
finds that the Constituyente (the process facilitating the drafting of a new 
constitution in 1999) had a high level of popular participation from civil 
society. Furthermore, within the text there are many clauses which further 
the ideal of "participation and protagonism", through direct democracy 
mechanisms such as popular assemblies, referendums, recall referendums 
etc.  
López Maya (2003) observes that the 1999 Constitution provides a different 
focus on democracy and inclusion than that found in the past in Venezuela, 
and goes against the grain of neoliberalism, emphasising the political and the 
social over the economic and procedural (Title I, Chapter VIII), human 
rights were brought up to date and widened (Title III) and the universal 
character of social rights were preserved and extended (Chapter V, arts. 86, 
87 and 88). The Constitution prohibits the sale of actions in the State oil 
company PDVSA and guarantees State control of the social security system. 
New institutions were introduced in the form of the Electoral and Citizen 
Powers, as well as the more traditional Executive, Legislative and Judicial 
powers.  
 Finally, all these participatory mechanisms at home are being 
developed within a network of regional agreements which promote similar 
values abroad. Agreements such as PetroCaribe, which provides discounted 
oil to Venezuela’s neighbours at favourable rates, often receiving goods in 
exchange instead of cash and the ALBA initiative (Bolivarian Alternative for 
Latin America and the Caribbean), which promotes reciprocity and national 
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rights in regional trade, all of which “conflict with the neoliberal paradigm” 
(Gibbs, 2006: 276).  
Popular organisation and participation therefore have a clear ideological 
function as their primary aim is to create alternatives to the hegemonic, 
neoliberal paradigm, at a local, national and regional level. They do not 
therefore simply have a ‘utility maximisation’ role as a rational choice 
perspective would have it, bolstering the leader or aiding ‘political combat’. 
This is not to say that such organisation will not assist in these tasks; it is not 
unreasonable to suppose that leaders seek to gain and maintain power and 
to use popular organisations to this end. To base analysis entirely on that 
perspective, however, in the case of Venezuela underestimates popular 
commitment to reforms over and above the loyalty to the leader. Many of 
the popular organisations playing fundamental roles in the Bolivarian 
revolution pre-date chavismo and will most likely continue if it disappears 
(Terry Gibbs, personal communication, 20 December, 2006).  As Wilpert 
(2006) indicates, however, “the latent personality cult around Chavez and 
the tendency towards personalistic politics in Venezuela in general” could 
wrest a certain amount of autonomy from the popular organizations 
currently being built in Venezuela.  
Laclau (2006: 60) identifies this phenomenon as “the legitimate question [of] 
the tension between the moment of popular participation and the moment 
of the leader, if the predominance of the latter will lead to the limitation of 
the former”. While Laclau maintains that all populisms are exposed to this 
danger, he warns, however, that “there is no golden rule which determines 
that succumbing to such a scenario is the manifest destiny of populism” 
(ibid.). Rather, he warns, that: “If there is a danger for Latin American 
democracy, it comes from neoliberalism and not from populism” (ibid: 61).  
To sum up therefore, in Venezuela we find a clear case of populism, but one 
which has, from the beginning, been associated with a formative ideology 
based on leftist, socialist, nationalist and regionalist principles and clearly 
opposed to neoliberalism. Popular participation, rather than simply 
functioning as a defence mechanism against elite opposition or in function 
of perpetuating the leader in power, is crucial to the successful development 
of bolivarianismo on the ground and creating permanent structural change 
in Venezuelan society.  
 
Conclusion 
To sum up then the following key points have been argued in this paper. 
Rational choice analyses of populism have severe explanatory limitations as 
they are based on a narrow leader-centred interpretation of its nature. 
Specifically the assumption that populist leaders are simply ‘thirsty for 
power’ and that collective organisation develops (or not as the case may be) 
due to the leaders’ power hunger, do not provide sufficient elements to 
explain such a complex phenomenon. In this paper instead, using Chávez 
and Fujimori as case studies, we have offered an alternative account for 
popular organisation in populism based on a Marxist perspective.  Firstly, in 
both cases we see clear indications of populist ‘ruptures’: the equivalence 
between different unsatisfied demands, the crystallisation of all of these 
demands around certain common symbols, and the emergence of a leader 
who incarnates the process of popular identification.  Unlike institutionalist 
accounts, however, in this article I have argued that both populist regimes 
are highly ideologised but in almost diametrically opposed directions. 
Whereas Fujimori used his power to implement a programme implanting a 
fully fledged ‘savage’ neoliberal model in Peru, Chávez on the other hand, 
through bolivarianismo, is leading a process of implementation of a counter-
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hegemonic project against neoliberalism and in favour of a form of “Twenty 
First Century Socialism”.  
It is unsurprising therefore that such differing ideological projects should 
have equally differing forms of popular organisation and mobilisation (or 
the lack of it). Neoliberalism, as Harvey (2005: 188) points out has “all along 
primarily functioned as a mask for practices that are all about the 
maintenance, reconstitution and restoration of elite class power”.  Such a 
project, therefore, would be by its very nature against popular organisation 
and mobilization. In the case of Peru, Fujimori came to power after an 
intense period of civil strife, which in the early 1980s saw very high levels of 
popular mobilization and organisation. It was in the utmost interest of the 
neoliberal project to neutralize and demobilize the remnants of that 
organisation and this is exactly what Fujimori achieved. 
Chávez on the other hand, came to power when the neoliberal order 
established under the Washington Consensus was beginning to unravel. 
Even the main architects and sponsors of that Consensus, the IMF and 
World Bank, were seeking new more inclusive mechanisms to reinvent 
neoliberalism. The Bolivarian experiment in Venezuela was at the forefront 
of a wave of change that has seen a shift to the Left in some of the most 
important countries of South America. Bolivarianismo is one of the most 
radical and innovative experiments in that so-called ‘pink tide’, as it seeks to 
place popular participation and mobilization at the centre of its policies, 
going against the tenets of neoliberalism.  Popular mobilization and 
participation is integral to bolivarianismo and not, as Roberts insists, simply 
a means to resist elite pressures. By ignoring the centrality of ideology to the 
formation of populist movements and instead overemphasising the leader’s 
“power hunger” to the detriment of popular agency as the principal agent 
for change, the institutionalist perspective wrests legitimacy from its analysis 
and limits the value of its contribution to contemporary debates about 
populism’s significance.  
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i See for example Dornbusch and Edwards (1991) and Sachs (1990) 
ii Dix (1985) and Castañeda (1993: 40), for example, 
iii Cammack, 2000: 146. 
iv These were: a reliance on unorganized largely poor informal groups and an adversarial 
relation to organized groups, such as unions and the political class; a strongly top-down 
approach and strong state to effect economic reform and boost the position of a strong leader; 
and distribution of costs through restructuring to organized sectors and benefits, and benefits 
to informal sectors through the end of hyperinflation and targeted welfare programmes.  See 
Weyland (1996). 
v Fujimori was of Japanese descent and as it is common in Peru to refer to anyone of Chinese, 
Japanese descent, or indeed anyone who has East Asian type eyes, as chino (Chinaman), he 
happily adopted that nickname. Cholo refers to people of mixed indigenous and European 
descent, usually from the Peruvian highlands.  
vi One example was a decree law demanding that everyone must provide information, 
economic or financial resources, goods and services whenever necessary to military personnel 
in emergency zones, or face penalties. Prominent Congress member Javier Diez Canseco 
described these security laws as a "white coup" (cited in Burgos, 1992: 10).  
vii. While Fujimori had not won the battle for the hearts of the public entirely, he had 
managed to 'fix the agenda' (Grompone 1998: 22). Polls showed that faith in political parties 
had fallen from 21% in 1990 to 12% in March 1992, in the judicial system from 23% to 14% 
and in Congress from 45% to 17% (Mc Clintock, 1996: 57). Fujimori's level of support 
oscillated at the beginning of his tenure, but by September 1991 approval had risen in 
February 1992 to 64% (Apoyo, 2000: 25). 
viii The ten points were: Modifying the present Constitution; Radically 'moralising' the Judicial 
Power'; modernising the public administration; pacifying the country; fighting against drug 
trafficking; punishing the immorality and corruption of public administration; promoting a 
market economy; reorganising the educational system; decentralising the faculties of the 
Central Government; raising living standards in the medium term (Fujimori 1992a).  
ix “Pure neoliberalism”.  
x In 1990 10.4% of the 54.4% of employees in formal private employment were temporary, 
but by 2000 24.3% were temporary out of the 45.5% of the workforce in such employment 
(Pascó-Font and Saavedra, 2001: 173) 
xi Strikes decreased from 11.6% of total man-hours in 1990 to 8.9% in 1995. In 1989/1990 
profits were 64.6% of national income and pay 34.4% but by 1996 profits increased to 77.8% 
while pay fell to 21.2% (Gonzales, 1998: 113). Furthermore between 1990 and 1996 the 
minimum wage was reduced by 30%. 
xii Fujimori’s decision to launch the autogolpe, on April 5 1992, saw his poll ratings soar from 
53% in March to 81% in April, 1992 and would remain above 60% for the rest of the year 
(Apoyo, 2000: 25). 
xiii Immediately after the coup Fujimori ruled by decree with the full support of the Armed 
Forces, concentrating all the powers of the state in his hands. In the following weeks he 
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dismantled the judiciary, sacking thirteen Supreme Court judges and more than 100 lower-
court judges and prosecutors, and he moved ahead to establish secret military tribunals to try 
suspected terrorists (Kláren, 2000: 414). 
xiv This reinforced the perception that it was the implementation of structural reform in a 
speedy manner that was the real reason for the autogolpe and not a result of Fujimori's 
inherent authoritarianism (Conaghan, 1996) (Ellner, 2003).  
xv "With Chávez the People Rule". Campaign slogan for 2000 Election Campaign.  
xvi Interview with Magarita López Maya, conducted in Caracas, April 2002. 
xvii By the turn of the 1980s the following leftist intellectuals were contacted all of whom at 
some time or other would occupy positions in Chávez's government after 1998: Luis 
Miquilena, Manuel Quijada, Lino Martínez, José Vincente Rangel, and Omar Mezza as well as 
university figures such as Luis Fuenmayor, Héctor Navarro, Jorge Giordani, Trino Alcides 
Díaz, and Adina Bastidas (López Maya, 2003: 76). 
xviii Chávez himself was one of the first graduates of this plan and went on to take a Masters 
degree in Political Science at the Simon Bolívar University in Caracas, although he did not 
graduate. 
xix See for example Carrasquero and Welsch (2001); Kaplan (2001); Koeneke (2000) 
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